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NO. 23 MAY 2018 Introduction 
The Global Debate on the Future of 
Artificial Intelligence 
The Need for International Regulation and Opportunities for German Foreign Policy 
Marcel Dickow and Daniel Jacob 
With the current developments in the field of artificial intelligence, the process 
of digitalisation has reached a new stage. Artificial intelligence makes it possible 
to analyse the large amounts of data collected today in completely new ways. Com-
panies and countries are spending considerable resources to take advantage of 
these analytical possibilities. However, artificial intelligence is also dependent on 
the quality of the underlying data; it is completely unsuited for many tasks and has, 
so far, largely escaped human control. Germany should therefore use its influence 
in international forums to regulate the use of artificial intelligence in politically 
sensitive areas. In addition, the Federal Government should carefully examine 
on what data basis, for what purposes, and under what conditions artificial intel-
ligence can make a contribution to the planning of foreign policy strategy. 
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is entering more 
and more areas of our lives. Companies use 
AI to create profiles of their customers and 
evaluate applications. In the medical field, 
progress is anticipated in both research and 
therapy. States, too, are increasingly relying 
on AI: In the context of “predictive polic-
ing”, they aim to enable police and intel-
ligence services to identify signs of crimes 
even before they are committed. Autono-
mous, AI-based weapons systems are 
supposed to make new forms of warfare 
possible. In the near future, it is also to 
be expected that states will use AI systems 
for the formation of their foreign policy 
strategies, for example through the real-
time evaluation of economic data from 
other states. 
The information processing by AI should 
make it possible in the future to separate 
the wheat from the chaff in the multitude 
of data. The actual decisions will probably 
remain with human beings. For now. When 
it comes to speed and analysis capacity, 
human beings are increasingly falling be-
hind compared to machines. Leaving the 
decision to the “perfect” machine is a 
tempting idea for time-critical applications, 
for example. However, as experiences with 
autonomous driving show, in the end – as 
with any new technology – human beings 
will need to intervene in a regulatory man-
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ner in order to avoid unwanted risks and 
define responsibilities. 
A particular challenge is that AI, as a 
technology, is not only subject to the regu-
latory efforts of politics. To the extent that 
public institutions use AI systems, AI will 
actually influence the political process 
itself. Legislative institutions, supervisory 
authorities, and international bodies there-
fore face the challenge of having to regulate 
portions of their own analysis and decision-
making instruments. 
Artificial Intelligence 
The term “artificial intelligence” has devel-
oped into a collective term for a series of 
computer-based methods. Many of today’s 
AI applications are based on data-driven, 
machine-learning processes. These methods 
require large amounts of pre-structured 
data that are used to teach algorithms. 
Machines thus learn to classify, for example 
to distinguish dogs from cats in photographs. 
The amount, quality, and representative-
ness of the training data are decisive factors 
for the informative value of the results. 
Strong and Weak AI 
In certain cases, data-driven AI systems 
can deliver better classification results than 
humans. However, there remain special 
solutions for particular problems that have 
not yet allowed for generalisations. Even 
the recognition of wolves overwhelms a sys-
tem that has been trained with photos of 
dogs and cats. Due to these inherent limi-
tations, the AI systems commonly used 
today are also referred to as “weak” AI sys-
tems. In the informatics and philosophy 
sphere, there are voices repeatedly empha-
sising that, in the future, machines could 
also be equipped with more highly devel-
oped human characteristics, for example 
with the ability to think conceptually. For 
this “strong” AI system, however, no imple-
mentation concepts are yet available. 
How Machines Learn 
One of the dominant methods of machine 
learning today is so-called deep learning with 
neural networks (deep neural networks). 
These networks work with several layers of 
branching points. The individual layers each 
capture only simple concepts, but their 
combination allows for complex analyses. 
Image recognition, for example, captures a 
number of characteristics that are not very 
meaningful in themselves, but which, in 
combination, make it possible to distinguish 
between dogs and cats, for example. 
Deep neural networks have a large num-
ber of such hidden layers in which prob-
ability values are formed during training 
(see Figure 1). To be sure, input and output 
are still in a defined mathematical relation-
ship to each other. However, this ratio is 
not based on logical conclusions, as is cus-
tomary for humans, but on statistical calcu-
lations. Such nested classification methods 
can intuitively derive simple rules for 
humans from observed behaviours that 
are difficult to programme using classical 
methods. However, this comes at a price: 
The analysis results of such deep neural 
networks cannot be validated without 
(time-consuming) mathematical methods. 
So-called reinforcement learning makes 
use of the structure of deep neural net-
works. Algorithms are programmed to 
develop strategies to solve problems by 
Figure 1 
Schematic representation of the structure of a 
neural network 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
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maximising success (indicated by rewards). 
The system is given an abstract goal that it 
achieves through a process of self-learning, 
that is, “trial and error”. Reinforcement 
learning is now an important factor in com-
plex control tasks, for example in the con-
trol of robotic systems. However, the inher-
ent uncertainty as to how the AI system 
solves the task considerably limits the areas 
of application. 
Research on AI 
Significant progress has been made with 
AI since the early 2010s. This was made 
possible by the increasing availability of 
structured data on the internet and the rise 
in the computing power and storage capac-
ity of modern computers. The networking 
of more and more devices in the context 
of the “Internet of Things” will further in-
crease the availability of usable data. 
The development of AI is mainly driven 
by large internet companies. They invest 
considerable sums and increasingly com-
pete for qualified personnel. For this 
reason, some of the leading companies in 
the United States publish selected research 
results and make individual software com-
ponents available to the scientific commu-
nity as “open source”. 
In the meantime, many countries have 
jumped on the bandwagon and launched 
state funding and development programmes. 
China, in particular, has announced sub-
stantial investments and has declared its 
intention to catch up with the technologi-
cal lead of the United States. Although 
Russia clearly falls short in comparison, it 
has also clearly articulated its ambitions in 
this field. The announcement of a Franco-
German AI centre can also be seen as a 
reaction to this technological competition. 
So far, however, the extent of government 
involvement in this area is difficult to 
assess: Even in democratic states, there is a 
lack of reliable figures that could provide 
information on the actual volume of invest-
ment. In countries such as China and the 
United States, things are even more difficult 
because their cooperation with companies 
is largely out of the public eye, especially 
when it comes to the use of AI by militaries. 
The Need for 
International Regulation 
The specific strength of AI systems is also 
the reason why they require regulation: 
Across the various applications, AI is char-
acterised by being able to evaluate data 
much faster than humans, and with an 
increasing degree of independence. This 
ability holds the promise of making better-
informed decisions. As a result, however, 
the responsibility for far-reaching decisions 
is transferred to computer systems, the 
proceedings of which are still difficult for 
humans to understand. AI is therefore 
sometimes referred to as the “black box”. 
This does not have to be problematic in 
every case. However, there is a need for 
regulation wherever AI systems are used 
in politically sensitive areas. The different 
norms of international law provide orien-
tation for the level of international regu-
lation. If Germany wants to maintain the 
efficacy of these standards, it is necessary 
to adapt them to the special challenges of 
AI systems. 
AI and State Coercion 
In the context of a state’s use of AI systems, 
human rights standards are a first impor-
tant starting point. They draw attention to 
those applications in which the use of AI 
systems is combined with governmental 
coercion. Already today, countries such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom 
use AI systems in their police work: Within 
the framework of predictive policing, pre-
dictions are made as to where, when, and 
from whom criminal acts can be expected. 
AI systems are also already being used in 
the United States to support court rulings, 
for example in the determination of pen-
alties. The culmination of these develop-
ments can be observed in China: There, 
the government is currently introducing 
a “Social Credit System”, with the help of 
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which the behaviour of citizens in almost 
all areas of life is to be recorded and auto-
matically translated into a rating that is 
reinforced by sanctions. 
It is still largely unclear whether and, if 
so, how a state’s use of AI systems can be 
reconciled with the requirements of human 
rights. This question arises in particular for 
the right to equal treatment and due pro-
cess (Article 14 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]) 
and the right to privacy (Article 17 ICCPR). 
An EU directive on the protection of per-
sonal data in the context of “the preven-
tion, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of 
sentences” (EU 2016/680) provides initial 
guidance for these matters. 
The use of AI systems by militaries falls 
primarily within the domain of interna-
tional humanitarian law. Many countries 
are already investing heavily in the devel-
opment of (partially) autonomous weapons 
systems. Even the partial transfer of deci-
sions concerning the use of violence to AI 
systems, however, would fundamentally 
call into question the protective mecha-
nisms of international humanitarian law. 
In response to these developments, within 
the framework of the Convention on Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a group 
of governmental experts was formed to 
develop proposals on how autonomous 
weapons systems could be regulated. 
AI and the Power of Companies 
There is also a need for regulation with re-
gards to the use of AI systems by private com-
panies. Again, the human rights norms of 
international law provide orientation: States 
are also responsible for protecting the rele-
vant legal interests from violations by third 
parties. Because most of the companies in 
this field operate transnationally, national 
measures must be supplemented by appro-
priate forms of international regulation. 
Private companies such as Amazon, 
Google, and Baidu use AI systems to create 
extensive profiles of their (potential) cus-
tomers. These profiles are often used for 
the comparatively harmless personalisation 
of advertising and the provision of digital 
services, such as the display of personalised 
messages. However, personal profiles can 
also form the basis for decisions with far-
reaching consequences: For example, banks 
are increasingly using AI systems to assess 
the creditworthiness of their customers. 
Companies such as LinkedIn also use such 
systems to evaluate the profiles of job 
seekers. Finally, AI systems are an essential 
element in the current development of 
autonomous transport systems by com-
panies such as Tesla, Google, and Baidu. 
Although this form of corporate use of AI 
systems does not involve the coercive power 
of the state, it has a significant impact on 
the lives of an increasing number of people. 
It is the responsibility of states to regulate 
this use in such a way that it complies with 
human rights requirements, such as the pro-
hibition of discrimination (Article 26 ICCPR) 
and the right to privacy (Article 17 ICCPR). 
Remarkably, some of the most important 
companies themselves are calling for a 
societal debate on the regulation of AI sys-
tems. Leading representatives of companies 
such as Deepmind, Apple, and IBM have 
participated in the development of the “Asi-
lomar AI Principles”. The principles, con-
ceived in Asilomar, California, in 2017, for-
mulate social requirements for the future 
development of AI systems. They also point 
to the need to create an appropriate legal 
framework for the use of AI. 
Regulatory Goals 
In order to meet the regulatory require-
ments outlined above, specific solutions are 
required that take account of the technical 
and political particularities of each case of 
application. Despite the diversity of applica-
tions, however, some overarching regulato-
ry objectives can be identified. 
“Garbage In, Garbage Out” 
The general objective is to avoid “false” 
results when using AI systems to support 
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decisions made by machine, to critically 
examine the informative value of the 
results, and to limit the negative effects 
of false analyses. As described, the per-
formance of today’s AI systems is based 
on the inductive evaluation of data. The 
quantity and quality of the available data 
therefore directly determine their per-
formance. Not surprisingly, there have 
recently been a number of reports about 
the risk of AI discrimination. The central 
problem was usually that AI systems repro-
duce existing discrimination in the data 
sets. For example, if historical data reflects 
that men have held more senior positions 
than women, an AI system may erroneously 
be led to the conclusion that men are gen-
erally better suited for such positions. 
Data selection therefore plays a central 
role when using AI systems. However, the 
systems themselves cannot provide any 
information about the quality of the data 
on which they are based. On the contrary, 
even if the data basis is insufficient, they 
will always produce a result, even if it is not 
reliable. Another complication is that more 
subtle forms of data-based discrimination 
are difficult to identify. It may still be com-
paratively easy to block an AI system that 
evaluates applicants from accessing infor-
mation on their gender. However, this 
does not exclude the possibility that other 
factors correlating with gender may be in-
cluded in the analysis. The less obvious this 
correlation is, the more difficult it becomes 
to identify it from the results alone. 
It is therefore a central responsibility of 
the developers and users of AI systems to 
carefully examine whether the available 
data are appropriate for the respective pur-
poses of the analysis. However, because this 
thoroughness cannot always be assumed, 
regulatory intervention is required in politi-
cally sensitive areas in three regards. 
Transparency 
As an elementary prerequisite for a critical 
examination of the effects of AI systems, a 
sufficient degree of transparency must first 
be established. To this end, it is essential 
that public and private institutions provide 
information on where – and for what pur-
poses – they are using AI systems. On this 
basis, affected persons must be able to un-
derstand how – and on the basis of which 
data – AI systems affect central aspects of 
their lives. Political decision-makers must 
also be informed in an understandable way 
about how public bodies and private actors 
are using AI systems. 
Defining this transparency requirement 
more precisely is a technical and legal chal-
lenge. Technically, it is by no means trivial, 
but nevertheless possible, to make such 
information available in an understandable 
way. AI systems should be designed to give 
information on the critical analysis para-
meters, to disclose how representative the 
training data is for the real data applica-
tions, and to indicate the error rates asso-
ciated with their analyses. Legally, it must 
be clarified how to reconcile access to mean-
ingful information with data protection 
and the right of companies to protect their 
intellectual property. Last but not least, it 
is possible that the persons affected them-
selves, or interested third parties, may use 
such information to manipulate the data-
bases of AI systems in a targeted manner. 
The first steps towards solving this com-
plex problem are offered by the European 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which will become binding in May of this 
year. The GDPR explicitly regulates the 
information and appeal rights of data sub-
jects in connection with automated data 
analyses (Article 22 GDPR). Also of interest 
in this context are the efforts of the city 
council of New York City to make the mu-
nicipal use of AI systems more transparent. 
At the end of 2017, the City Council decided 
to establish an expert group to investigate 
the use of automated decision systems in 
New York’s public administration. The 
group is due to start work in the next few 
months. 
Human Control 
The attraction of AI lies in delegating activ-
ities previously carried out by humans 
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to machines. In politically sensitive areas, 
however, it is necessary to examine the 
areas in which the operation of AI systems 
should be subject to particular human 
control. 
The classification methods of modern AI 
systems are often used to reveal previously 
hidden statistical correlations. However, 
such data correlation can neither presup-
pose nor prove causality. It is therefore 
essential to subject AI-based decisions to 
human plausibility checks. This requires 
the transparency of the data and algorithms 
already described. In addition, sufficient 
time must be available for such a plausibil-
ity check and to be able to reconstruct the 
procedures of AI systems. In fact, in many 
cases, it is also legally sensible to demand 
such a comprehensive plausibility check. 
In cases where decisions are made with far-
reaching consequences for those affected, 
human control cannot be limited to operat-
ing a “yes/no” dialogue box on the screen. 
Rather, it is necessary that the users of such 
systems actively deal with the system and 
application parameters. 
A fictitious example illustrates the chal-
lenge: A company offers AI-based software 
that analyses satellite images and provides 
proposals for deployment planning during 
a German military mission abroad. In a first 
step, the data basis used for training the 
system must be checked for representative-
ness and applicability. This testing should 
not be left to the company offering the 
software. In such a politically sensitive area, 
this should instead be done by an inde-
pendent body. 
In a second step, the local commanders 
must confirm the results of the expert sys-
tem in each individual case – or correct 
them, if necessary – after they have sub-
jected the system to a documented inspec-
tion process. This requires that they have 
the necessary professional competence. It 
remains a question as to how this compe-
tence can be developed and maintained 
when situation assessments in the future 
will increasingly be based on expert sys-
tems. 
Clear Responsibilities 
The example of the use of AI in the plan-
ning of military missions also points to the 
need to define clear responsibilities for the 
use and certification of AI-based systems. 
International humanitarian law, for 
example, requires members of armed forces 
to carry out a legal and moral assessment 
prior to the use of force. Among other 
things, it must be determined whether the 
chosen military means are appropriate and 
necessary. According to the prevailing 
understanding of international law, human 
beings must make such considerations and 
must not leave them to machines. The pro-
posal to grant AI systems a limited status 
as legal entities and to make them liable in 
this way is therefore not convincing. 
Instead, the aim should be to clearly 
state the responsibilities of human beings 
for the use of AI systems. With regards to 
the various military and civilian applica-
tions, it is also necessary to clarify the 
responsibilities of the manufacturers of AI 
systems. 
Artificial Intelligence in 
Foreign Policy Planning 
It is to be assumed that AI systems will also 
change foreign policy planning and decision-
making in the near future. The enormously 
advanced possibilities of data processing by 
AI make it possible to offer forecasts on 
the consequences of specific foreign policy 
decisions and to record their effects in real 
time. In a way, this can be seen as an exten-
sion of traditional intelligence analysis. 
However, automated analyses by AI systems 
now make it possible to process larger 
amounts of data and to link data of differ-
ent types and origins. For example, such 
systems are expected to be used in the 
future for early crisis detection, but also in 
the event of pandemics or the analysis of 
global migration flows. For precisely this 
purpose, the Federal Foreign Office (AA) is 
currently setting up a data-based analysis 
system in the Department for Crisis Pre-
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vention, Stabilisation, Post-conflict Care and 
Humanitarian Aid. According to the AA, the 
system will initially evaluate publicly avail-
able data on social, economic, and political 
developments. Beyond analysis, states will 
also try to use AI to strengthen their offen-
sive and defensive cybersecurity capacities. 
These applications of AI systems have the 
potential to improve the information base 
for foreign policy decisions. But here, too, 
support from AI systems can only be as 
good as the underlying data allow. In addi-
tion, it must always be questioned which 
analyses AI systems are suited for, and 
which analyses are not. Even the best AI 
cannot replace political judgment. Finally, 
the use of such systems must be transpar-
ent – at least for decision-makers in parlia-
ment and government – and must always 
be subject to adequate human control. 
However, this is made more difficult by the 
fact that foreign policy decision-making has 
traditionally not been open to public scru-
tiny; this is true in almost all countries. 
Tasks for German Foreign Policy 
The development and application of AI are 
still in their infancy worldwide. This is a 
political opportunity, as it provides an occa-
sion to actively shape the future techno-
logical and political development. The 
abovementioned regulatory objectives pro-
vide a normative guideline for this. How-
ever, they must be further developed and 
specified with a view to the particularities 
of specific applications. 
Clarifications of the associated ethical, 
legal, and political questions are a core task 
of the Bundestag as a centre of the demo-
cratic public. A comprehensive debate is 
needed on how, and under which condi-
tions, AI is to be used in which areas of 
society. A debate must also be held about 
which forms of national and, above all, 
international regulation are suitable for 
effectively implementing the corresponding 
political requirements. To this end, it is 
essential that the relevant considerations 
and processes within the framework of 
the EU and the United Nations be taken 
into account in the German debate. It was 
recently announced that the European 
Commission not only wants to expand 
research funding, but that it is also working 
on guidelines for dealing with the legal and 
ethical challenges of AI. The International 
Telecommunications Union is also increas-
ingly addressing this issue. At the United 
Nations, negotiations on the use of autono-
mous weapons systems continue within 
the framework of the CCW. 
There is thus a considerable need for 
clarification. In this respect, it seems sen-
sible to broaden the scope of the debate. 
The “Data Ethics Commission” envisaged 
in the current coalition agreement, for 
example, could offer an opportunity to 
supplement the necessary parliamentary 
debate with contributions from science, 
business, and civil society. 
In addition to these fundamental clarifi-
cations, however, it is also necessary to 
be able to act today on the foreign policy 
issues relating to the use of AI. There is 
international recognition that, with the 
German Research Center for Artificial Intel-
ligence (DFKI), Germany is well-positioned 
in the field of basic research. As in other 
areas of digitalisation, however, a unified 
foreign policy approach is made more dif-
ficult by the fact that the responsibility for 
AI matters is spread across a number of 
departments. The responsibility for research 
funding lies with the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research, whereas the Fed-
eral Ministry of Justice is responsible for- 
legal issues relating to the application of 
AI, and the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs is responsible for the effects 
on the labour market. The Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, the AA, and the intelligence 
services are primarily concerned with ques-
tions concerning the operational use of AI. 
Responsibility for the relevant debates in 
the various international forums is divided 
between the AA, the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy, and the 
Chancellor’s Office. 
This broad institutional spread is in some 
ways appropriate to the thematic breadth, 
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because AI does indeed affect a variety of 
policy areas. However, if Germany wishes 
to exert its foreign policy influence on the 
future development of AI, stronger coordi-
nation is needed. The creation of the posi-
tion of Minister of State for Digitalisation 
in the Chancellor’s Office, for example, is a 
promising measure that could be the start-
ing point for an AI group of departmental 
experts based in the Chancellor’s Office. 
 
Dr. Marcel Dickow is Head of the International Security Division at SWP.  
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© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2018 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects  
the author’s views. 
The online version of  
this publication contains 
functioning links to other  
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject  
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP 
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ 
quality-management-for-
swp-publications/ 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und  
Politik 
German Institute for  
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 24/2018) 
